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Australian administrative elites and  
the challenges of digital-era change 
 
Patrick Dunleavy and Mark Evans 
 
 
Abstract:  Within long-lived public sector bureaucracies the organizational cultures 
developed by administrative elites have strong filtering and focusing effects on the kinds of 
technological changes adopted, especially in the modern era. Normally seen as very slow-
moving and hard to alter, senior officials’ attitudes towards digital changes have recently 
begun to change in more substantial ways in Australia. We review first a considerable 
reappraisal of the priority given to digital changes by top public services managers. This 
cultural shift has followed on from tech-lead disruptive societal changes affecting most areas 
of government now, and from the rise of global-scaled ICT corporations to become key 
management exemplars for officials. Second, we look at the chequered history of political 
leaders’ interventions to speed up digital change, showing that in the period 2015-19 
Australia witnessed both the initial power and later limits of such involvement. Finally, we 
consider Australia’s recent experience with BDAI (big data/artificial intelligence), a key area 
of technological change for public service officials, but one that in a liberal democracy can 
also easily spark public resistance to their plans. 
 
 
In the mid 2000s Dunleavy et al argued that 
‘it makes sense to characterize the broad sweep of current public management regime 
change in terms [of] new information-handling potentialities… The advent of the digital 
era is now the most general, pervasive, and structurally distinctive influence on how 
governance arrangements are changing in advanced industrial states’ (Dunleavy et al. 
2006, p. 478). 
 
Yet Christopher Pollitt (2009, p. 31-2) observed that ‘technological change is a powerful 
shaping influence on public administration… [yet] one which is seldom directly addressed…. 
[T]he majority of [PA] scholars proceed with their usual business, making few, if any, 
references to technological change’. The only exception Pollitt saw was a ‘ghettoized’ 
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discussion of e-government (p.32), more than a bit divorced from mainstream public 
administration. Nearly a decade later, Andrews (2018, pp.10-11) could still note that: 
‘Technological change remains under-researched and under-theorized in the public 
administration literature…’.  For a number of key reasons, however, this picture has now 
begun to change rapidly, albeit in a somewhat lagged fashion. A key reason for public 
administration scholars starting to ‘catch up’ with the importance of tech issues has been that 
the administrative elites (on whom most academics focus attention) have themselves recently 
re-prioritized IT systems and online transactions and information. 
The first section of the paper explores multiple (and slightly miscellaneous) reasons 
why administrative cultures have changed in relatively short order, so as to assign a new 
priority to officials understanding and responding to digital change. Our key data sources 
come from systematic interviews in 2016 with senior civil servants from all branches of the 
Australian federal government (the Commonwealth level), plus near-continuous research 
engagements with a range of federal departments and different levels of officials (from senior 
staff to new trainees).1 The core story here speaks to the rise of Silicon Valley companies 
creating disruptive digital changes even in areas of administration previously unaffected by 
them, and also changing the way that senior managers think about organizational issues.  
Within the public services, however, there clearly remain some distinctive barriers to the 
adoption of new organizational technologies.  
In section II, we consider how Australia (as a ‘Westminster system’ country) creates a 
potential for political leaders to stimulate public service changes, and some of the limitations 
that surround their doing so in digital change areas. The final section explores some of the 
issues around the newest ‘state of the art’ governance approaches, which combine ‘big data 
and artificial intelligence’ (BDAI) to seek new levels of evidence-based interventions. We 
examine how the Australian civil service has responded to the early potential of ‘big data’ 
and some of the challenges illuminated by the first ambitious efforts to innovate with 
selection algorithms in this area.  
 
I. Administrative elites ‘buy in’ to digital change 
Strongly influenced by UK experience, the Australian civil service closely follows the lower-
profile ‘professional’ bureaucracy path that Silberman (1993) argues characterizes the British 
and American types of civil service system. The Australian Public Service developed on a 
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‘generalist’ model, with substantial cross-departmental moves as part of a career promotion 
trajectory. The socialization of APS officials into ‘public interest’ values was mainly 
achieved via university education and some low-key, cross-departmental institutions that 
sustain a common APS organizational culture.  Following the ‘Westminster system’ model 
the civil service also evolved as a generalist-dominated set-up - closely responsive to 
ministerial and political direction (Weller, 2001). Canberra too ran under the ‘Armstrong 
doctrine’ that the civil service has no constitutional standing or personality separate from the 
government of the day. 
However, Australia’s post-war reliance on continuous immigration as a key motor of 
economic growth also vested all three tiers of government - federal, state and local authorities 
(in big cities at least) – with some ‘development bureaucracy’ features. For instance, 
professional and scientific agencies at various times assumed greater prominence in fostering 
agricultural and urban growth than in the UK model. These strands were easily incorporated 
into the ‘progressive public administration’ (PPA) quasi-paradigm current in the Keynesian 
heyday of the 1960s and ’70s (Hood, 1995), giving top federal officials greater respect of 
science, an attitude sometimes reflected in their more autonomous impacts on policy (Pusey, 
1991, p.241; Bell, 1995). The APS also grew rapidly from just over 60,000 staff in 1941 to 
around 240,000 by the early 1970s (Halligan, 2004, p. 74)  
This proved a peak in numbers, however, with staff falling back to 150,000 by the 
1990s, and then to around 120,000 by the 2000s, half its peak size, (Halligan, 2004, p. 74). A 
large part of this latter change reflected first the arrival of cross-party ‘economic rationalism’ 
approaches in Canberra (Pusey, 2001), and later the evolution of fully fledged new public 
management (NPM) doctrines, albeit in somewhat humanistic form (MacDemott, 2008). This 
change reflected a greater political scepticism about bureaucratic expertise and greater policy 
assertiveness by Labour and Liberal/National governments. With continuous economic 
growth still maintained (albeit at lower levels), and recent decades’ tax receipts boosted by 
mining exports, the federal APS has never really faced strong austerity or cutback pressures – 
but longer-term staff- and resource-capping succeeded the previous decades of personnel 
growth. These pressures were at various times associated with the contracting out of IT 
services, greater use of e-government, and early forms of administrative automation.  
In 2013 the outgoing Australian Public Service Commissioner, Stephen Sedgwick 
commented (2014, p. 3): 
‘Today there is no doubt that the elected government sets the agenda and defines the 
national interest. And looking back over 30 years, it is clear the APS culture has 
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changed to afford primacy to that reality. But, having successfully created a responsive, 
action-oriented culture, concerns emerged that the APS may have become too reactive, 
too focused on the short term and the delivery of tasks, and unable to generate the range 
of new ideas that it might have liked. . .. . .  
      [A]mendments to the Public Service Act introduced in 2013 were intended to 
clarify the leadership responsibilities of APS leaders. These leaders remain responsible 
for delivering the government’s immediate agenda. In addition, APS leaders are 
required to develop the capability to provide forward-looking, creative contributions to 
government about what that agenda should be, and to be stewards of an enduring 
institution who scan the horizon and build capability within their agency ahead of 
predictable need’. [Our italics] 
 
A key area of such stewardship is, of course, the operating technology and organization of 
departments and agencies, and their appropriateness for future tasks and eras. 
 When we examine how a given civil service culture adapts (or not) to digital changes 
pressures, it is important to take account of multiple other pressures. Governments have long 
been ‘technology takers’ in how IT and digital changes are incorporated in their own 
administrative processes. In their uses of digital technologies and systems, departments and 
agencies have generally followed along behind the corporate sector, and in some respects 
even behind consumers and citizens at large. In many new public management (NPM) 
countries, including the UK and Australia, extensive outsourcing of IT and digital tech to 
system integrator corporations left government officials struggling to maintain even 
‘intelligent customer’ capability to critically assess the services (and prices) that they 
received from contractors (Dunleavy et al, 2006; 2008). They also lead to successive IT 
project cancellations and under-performances – such as that of Queensland health care system 
(Chisnall, 2018; Chesterman, 2013). There are often popularly mis-construed as government 
‘blunders’ occurring at elite level (King and Crewe, 2013). Such incidents, along with the 
increased risks surrounding privacy losses of data and cyber-security problems over time, all 
tended to increase Australian civil servants’ (and even contractors’) aversion to undertaking 
large-scale IT projects – an attitude still visible in some agencies in our 2016 interviews. Not 
surprisingly, even recent analyses by public management scholars close to top officials 
accord little attention to tech-related issues: 
 ‘Every time an era is identified, the inadequacies are quickly found, the dissatisfaction, 
 the problems. That is unsurprising. Each generation has its challenges. 
 Technology is obviously one; we do not want or need administrative arrangements 
 from a century ago…’ (Weller and Haddon, 2016, p. 489). 
 
One consequence of IT and digital issues receiving little priority in top officials’ value 
systems has been a ‘stop-go’ pattern of digital change inside Canberra’s federal government, 
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with periods of rapid change (as from 1990 to 2002) succeeded by periods of relative 
stagnation in digital progress (as in the 2003-13 period). PM John Howard promised in 1997 
that ‘all appropriate services would be delivered electronically’ by 2001. And Australia was 
an early leader in e-Government (Accenture 2003; Chen et al., 2007), developing an 
international reputation that peaked in the early noughties (Clift 2002).  In the mid-2000s 
Australia still seemed close to NPM-leader countries like the UK and New Zealand in terms 
of its adoption of NPM, weak IT-industrial policies and restrictive Westminster system 
executive predominance (Dunleavy et al, 2008). The country’s ‘e-government’ policy 
outcomes and IT systems implementation were still more effective than elsewhere, partly due 
to citizens’ and enterprises’ strong early adoption of internet technologies, and the legacies of 
a relatively coherent e-government strategy in the late 1990s.  
From then on, however, progress slowed and became rather mixed across 
departments. Australia missed the original Howard e-government target for services to be up 
online by 16 years, despite it being a low risk digital change (Goggin, 2005). At state level 
interviews showed that: ‘IT is not considered a core activity in many government 
departments’ (Graham and Scarborough, 1997, p. 35). Halligan and Moore (2004) noted the 
absence of a unifying vision to inform Commonwealth level change. Some arms-length 
implementation agencies emerged to handle ‘blended’ or more IT-intensive solutions for 
delivering public services, especially Centrelink (Halligan, 2011). But although large, these 
bodies were seen by top officials as inherently specialist, necessarily located at several 
removes from the APS mainstream. In the mid-2010s Australia still fared well in the plethora 
of consultancy ratings of e-government, for instance, ranking second to South Korea in a UN 
ranking (United Nations, 2014, p. 15). But the frontiers of digital change had in fact 
substantially moved on from the kinds of things featuring as components in dated e-gov 
indices. 
 By contrast, in our 2016 interviews senior APS officials clearly recognized that digital 
changes in civil society had both accelerated in tempo and broadened out in scope, so that it 
was now hard all aspects of domestic governance to keep up. The ‘move fast and break 
things’ style of Silicon Valley corporations (Taplin, 2017; Ganesh, 2018) has often meant 
that officials are caught by surprise. Previous ‘backwater’ areas of public management have 
been transformed by the sudden arrival of radical disruptors – as with taxi administration and 
Uber, or property regulation and Air BnB. In some cases, regulatory officials have been 
forced to change within two years from operating in an early twentieth century, paper-based 
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regulation fashion to trying to regulate brand new digital marketplaces. Similarly, previously 
labour-intensive regulatory bureaucracies, such as customs and immigration systems, have 
been telescoped by digital IT changes since the late 1990s into becoming some of the most 
high tech, ‘zero touch technology’ (and even robotic) areas of government.  
 In the mid-2000s also, government officials in large countries (like the USA) or medium 
countries (like Australia and the UK) still took pride in the greater scale of their datasets 
compared with those of their domestic private sector counterparts, in the unrivalled quality 
and depth of government information and statistics, and in the enhanced security and privacy 
protection of government data compared with firms’ provision. By 2016 top Canberra 
officials recognized that that era has long since passed, perhaps especially in Australia with 
its relatively small national population (26 million people). All the big American GAFAM 
companies (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft) now run cloud datasets in real 
time for hundreds of millions (or even billions) of customers. And their scale, updating time, 
and quality of security and privacy protection all dwarf or match those of government-run 
systems.  
 Thanks to social scientists, governments also used to have access to official data, 
statistics and analyses that clearly out-performed corporate sector information sources. But 
now corporate data holdings are beginning to dwarf official datasets, in their speed of 
renewal, in the intimacy and sensitivity of the data handled, and in the quality of detailing 
about individuals, households and enterprises that they can give (Savage and Burrows, 2007; 
Bastow et al, 2014, p. 133). Officials in business-facing Australian departments were the 
most aware of this important shift. 
 
 The concept of government as the sole or prime regulator of economic and social life has 
also taken a knock on many fronts. The key Silicon Valley platform companies, whom 
Tusikov (2016) terms ‘macro-intermediaries’, have emerged as the predominant global 
regulators of content and user behaviours on their indispensable sites. They are also often key 
controllers of payments, e-identities and other matters. Beyond the USA and China, and the 
collective weight of the EU, no national government of Australia’s scale now has much 
individual leverage with the internet giants on how their internal processes operate across 
multiple national markets simultaneously. In many key respects (such as the visibility of a 
business to its potential customers) the internal, ‘private law’ regulation of content users’ 
behaviour by platform providers, and the detailed ways that the giant companies run their 
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operations, have already rivalled or even displaced public law in importance.  Perhaps this is 
because of long lags in governments adjusting their regulatory set up, that may be rectified in 
time. But it also undeniably reflects the salience of GAFAM companies’ services to citizens 
and firms in Australia, who have (as elsewhere) come to depend on them. 
Officials also recognized the importance and pervasive effects of firms and consumers 
switching over to smartphone and cloud-based services. There were approximately 13.5 
million internet subscribers in Australia at the end of December 2016, and only a small 
minority of people were without some level of access (ABS, 2017). Although it might have 
seemed a natural progression for a development state with major infrastructure experience, 
the huge scale of Australian distances has meant that only low progress was made in 
implementing the National Broadband Network (NBN). By 2016 Australia only ranked 50th 
in the world on some connection speeds (Guardian, 2016).  
Most top officials repeatedly stressed in our interviews that citizens now fully expect 
the same quality of transactions with government that they experience with private firms and 
other service providers through their Ipad or smart phone. All new services would have to be 
digitally based, and designed from the outset for citizens who are ‘digital natives’. Not to 
keep up, risked government becoming less nodal in society, and hence getting pushed more 
and more to the fringes of networks and conversations that mattered to citizens, and many 
firms. The Mygov.au portal site, with its strong links to different services like taxation, 
welfare and immigration was seen as reflecting this pressure. Only a few officials still held to 
the previous elite conventional wisdom, that government websites and online services only 
need to be ‘plain cooking’ without frills, because citizens by and large visit them only when 
they are forced to do so.  
The extent to which this implies changes in the way that the APS operates can be 
gauged from official targets. It was not until comparatively late on that the Department of 
Finance (2013) partly followed the UK’s lead in using digital changes to foster large 
expenditure reductions. In June 2013 they introduced quite a loose ‘digital first’, requiring 
that ‘by December 2017 Australians will be able to complete the vast majority of their 
business with government online’. In 2016 the Turnbull government converted this rather 
vague goal into more of a ‘digital by default’ policy on UK lines. All departments or agencies 
having more than 50,000 transactions with firms or citizens per year needing to achieve 80% 
transactions online - but by 2025, a very long time-frame indeed. Many medium and small 
agencies remained outside the target’s reach though. 
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A report compiled by Deloitte (2015) assumed that the target would be met and then 
projected what else would need to change so as to attain it. The results are shown in Table 1 
below. Online transactions in 2015 were estimated at three fifths of the total, and the scenario 
for boosting that to 80% target assumed an even-handed halving of postal and face-to-face 
transactions as a result. However, this was not an independent analysis either of likely trends 
in government’s ‘channel mix’, nor a prediction of whether the 80% target will in fact be 
under- or over-achieved. 
Table 1: Forecast trends in Australian federal government transactions volumes  
 
 
Source: Deloitte (2015, Table 3.2).  
 
 
 A more subtle influence on top officials’ views concerns how far the rise of the GAFAM 
companies has altered the wider management models that administrative leaders have in mind 
when orientating their careers and their organizations’ development paths towards future 
trends. In business management (and in academic business schools’ management theory) the 
priority assigned to the digital capabilities of companies and industries has greatly increased 
compared to previous decades. Digital technologies have come to dominate and disrupt many 
private business sectors, changing the whole organization of industries and firms (Bloom et 
al, 2009), instead of being confined to IT areas.  So, for all corporate managements now their 
ability to anticipate and adapt to a constant stream of fast-moving digital changes has become 
the acid test of success. Australia’s top civil servants once stood aloof from such tech-driven 
management thinking, but now they no longer do so. Where once their chosen comparators 
were Australian banks, insurance or resources companies, by 2016 officials’ primary sources 
of inspiration and examples of good management practices were digitally-based and 
innovation-orientated companies, especially the key Silicon Valley platform corporations.  
Type of transaction
Forecast % of 
2025 
transactions 





Online 79.9 60.4 5.2
Phone 8.7 17.1 24.3
Postal 6.1 12.0 33.0
Face to face 5.3 10.4 37.6





 Towards the end of our interviews we asked all of our interviewees if digital changes had 
now plateaued, or were they likely to continue in the next decade at or above the pace of 
recent years.  They unanimously chose the latter. No one in government now expects a ‘quiet 
life’ on the technology and organizational fronts – a significant change from senior leaders’ 
attitudes in earlier periods. 
 There are multiple ways in which administrative macro-cultures can change an earlier 
conventional wisdom so as to try out alternative approaches. Public managers operate (by and 
large) with only ‘quasi-paradigms’ competing for plausibility, so there is no Kuhnian death-
match where a successor doctrine must completely drive out its predecessor via rigorous 
proof or experimentation (Margetts and Dunleavy, 2013, pp.1-2). Instead different 
management philosophies may be layered on top of one another (as NPM was with the earlier 
PPA culture in Australia). Or they may be segmented, with older views holding sway over 
part of the terrain, but new ones influencing a defined area (as with DEG in the older, 
segmented ‘e-government’ area). Or across a broader area of concerns the old and new 
approaches may blur and inter-penetrate each other, producing some form of synthesis. Our 
interviews yielded evidence of all four super-cession processes operating in different types of 
organizations. DEG ideas extensively replacing NPM were most evident in the largest 
transactions handling departments, while segmentation remained strongest in small policy 
departments. Other agencies showed a layering of NPM and DEG processes in some cases, or 
a blurring together of NPM and DEG ideas driven by multiple processes.  
 
 
II. Political leadership on digital change 
Australian officials can generally look forward to rising government spending with some 
equanimity – for instance, even the global financial crisis of 2008 left the economy relatively 
unruffled. However, it did produce an emergency savings whip-round by the then Labour 
government, who cut federal IT funding by 20% in the crisis’s onset year, in order to raise 
resources for a precautionary increase in bank liquidity. That ‘political’ interference with 
long term IT spending was accepted at the time, but was still frequently cited by officials in 
our 2016 interviews as disruptive of planned IT and digital development. It was also seen as 
of a piece with longer term political imperatives to limit the size and cost of government, a 
stance now recognized as unlikely to shift much with changes of partisan control in Canberra.  
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Looking forward, a minority of officials (often in smaller departments) were pessimistic 
about what tight political controls meant for their ability to develop a thriving culture of 
digital change, or even just keeping their IT systems and business-critical software up to date 
in some smaller agencies. The majority recognized a paradox, however. In the long term, 
caps on spending provided conditions that incentivized their organizations towards adopting 
more digital change. But in the short term, funding constraints and under-funding also 
complicated or obstructed the investments needed to achieve medium- to long-term 
efficiency gains. 
Top officials recognize that pressures from voters on politicians to keep down 
government costs will also shape digital changes in their relatively ‘immortal’ (or at least 
very long-lasting) organizations (Kaufman, 1976). They recognize and have internalized the 
proposition of ‘Baumol’s law’, that the relative price of low productivity services will 
ineluctably rise compared to those in high productivity sectors of the economy (Dunleavy and 
Carrera, 2013; New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2018). But now officials also 
generally see Moore’s Law (that the processing power of microchips will double every two 
years) as a possible countervailing development, offering a route out for improving public 
services fast, perhaps even faster than in some private industries. 
 Australia’s early e-government phase through the 1990s was extensively shaped first 
by Labour ministers looking for NPM modernizations, and later by the Howard governments’ 
insistence on outsourcing ICT services to major system integrators and achieving spending 
reductions. The long ‘stop’ period in the pace of ICT development from 2003 to 2013 was 
only hesitantly modified by the Labour governments of 2007-13, with renewed ministerial 
interest in digital change surfacing only at the end of the period. The return of Liberal-
National government under Abbott put the federal civil service on the defensive again, with 
the PM widely seen as unsympathetic to long-term planning for public sector modernization 
– as opposed to shrinking. 
 When Malcom Turnbull became PM in September 2015 (following an internal Liberal 
party ‘spill’ deposing Abbott) he struck a far more emollient note, urging the Australian 
Public Service to embrace digital changes: ‘One of the pillars of our innovation agenda is 
government as an exemplar. I want you to be bold in your thinking. I want you to lead by 
example’ (Turnbull, 2016). To pioneer cultural change Turnbull closely followed the 
template of the UK’s successful Government Digital Service (GDS) (National Audit Office, 
2017). He created a Digital Transformation Office (DTO) to undertake hands-on IT 
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modernization projects jointly with staff in federal departments. On GDS lines, the aim was 
to ‘seed’ a greater understanding of modern online and digital potentials across a wider 
swathe of public managers. A leading figure from the IT efforts in the UK’s Ministry of 
Justice, Paul Shetler, was imported to run DTO, and given a wide brief and a lot of freedom.  
 Shetler succeeded in hiring creative staff and getting six or seven digital change 
projects under way with departments per year. DTO also held conferences, ran training 
sessions and created a blog designed to ‘spread the culture’ of bottom-up digital 
transformation amongst ICT and sympathetic policy staff throughout the APS. Almost 
immediately Shetler met some frictional resistance and scepticism from many department 
Secretaries. Even in the DOT’s early days, at the time of our 2016 interviews, some 
Secretaries clearly felt that its philosophy of grass-roots-change via pilot projects run jointly 
with departments threatened their integrated control over strategy and staffing. A minority of 
our senior respondents gave clear sceptical signals about the ‘transformative’ and delivery 
emphasis of the DTO, and tagged its head Shetler as a Canberra outsider who would have to 
learn the ropes to succeed. And despite Shetler’s radical evangelism about ‘transforming 
Australian government’, others saw DTO’s few, modest interventions as too unambitious in 
scale to make much impact on APS culture in any reasonable timeframe.  
 These cautious voices also argued that maintaining any Prime Ministerial momentum 
behind digital transformation would become progressively more difficult, unless it was 
successfully institutionalized early on. The focus that Turnbull could give digital change 
issues as PM would be likely to diminish, as other issues piled up demanding his urgent 
attention. And so it proved to be. In a 2016 reorganization pressed through by a junior 
minister in the Prime Minister’s and Cabinet Office (PMCO), the DTO ceased to be an 
independent agency reporting to the PM. Instead it was moved within the line management of 
the PMCO department, renamed the Digital Transformation Agency and given a new and 
additional parcel of service-wide digital/IT regulation functions (GovInsider, 2016). Now 
reporting to a generalist civil servant, Shetler was effectively demoted from being Chief 
Executive to becoming just the Chief Information Officer of the new Digital Transformation 
Agency. He soon resigned, citing ‘philosophical differences’ with the minister (Nott, 2017a).  
Having left for Singapore, a few months later Shetler gave a series of interviews that were 
unusually critical of the federal civil service, and that lifted the lid on some of the internal 
conflicts around digital change policies. He argued that ‘the Australian Public Service must 
wean itself off the "eye-watering" expense of hiring contractors and temps to undertake its IT 
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projects’ (Towell, 2017a).  In The Mandarin (a house blog for upper level APS officials) 
Shetler 
‘said [that] under his leadership the DTA had only made “a start” on exemplar projects, 
whole-of-government platforms and delivery hubs but still had a lot of work left to do, 
pointing to over 1524 federal government websites, lots of “broken customer journeys” 
and “repeated IT failures” over recent years as the proof’ (Easton, 2017). 
 
 At the least then, the chequered fortunes of DTO (now DTA) point up some of the 
acute difficulties in political, ministerial or Prime Ministerial initiatives acting as agents of 
long-run, sustainable digital change in the APS as whole. In an era of rapid turnover of 
‘disposable’ political leaders (Tiffen, 2017, Ch.3), and marked by the political short-termism 
induced by Australia’s three year electoral cycle and 24/7 media pressures, the support of the 
Australian PM powerfully generalized the recognition of digital modernization’s salience 
amongst administrative elites – but only for a relatively short time.  
 Even in the toned-down and more conventional-looking form of the Digital 
Transformation Agency, the political push for digital era governance was vulnerable. In 
August 2018 Turnbull too was voted out as PM by his party, and replaced by the Treasurer, 
Scott Morrison. DTA continued under the new premier, but by early 2019 speculation grew 
that it might soon be downgraded further in importance, by being moved from PMCO to 
become just another (primarily regulatory) part of the budget agency, the Ministry of 
Finance. 
 
III. Big data and artificial intelligence – early experiences 
 
Big data can be defined in multiple ways, but its most distinctive features include having very 
large volumes of data (e.g. petabytes), that is frequently updated (ideally in real time) and 
offers a comprehensive picture of the population of cases (so it is a census and not a sample) 
(Kitchin, 2014). ‘Big data’ analysis has widespread application in the government sector 
(Dunleavy, 2016), especially when allied with the algorithmic methods of artificial 
intelligence considered below. Yet there is also considerable public resistance to automatic 
and impersonal systems being used that might erode citizens’ privacy in new ways. An 
immediate impact has been to rule out government agencies themselves being able to analyse 
citizens’ or enterprises’ digital footprints or social media data, except in the special fields of 
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national security, counter-terrorism or counteracting organized crime. Fears of a ‘big brother’ 
or omni-surveillance state inhibit any direct learning from around half of all contemporary 
‘big data’, despite their huge potential and immediate (real time) relevance for much 
government work. As in other countries, Australian citizens are far more willing to trust 
GAFAM companies and other service suppliers with immensely detailed real-time 
information about their behaviours than they are government agencies. However, academic 
research using social media data in anonymized ways (and perhaps some kinds of 
consultancy work) undertaken for government agencies is still feasible. 
 As a result, ‘big data’ analyses within government still focus almost exclusively on 
‘administrative data’, that is information owned by the agencies concerned, and primarily 
generated through transactions like paying taxes, claiming welfare payments, seeking licenses 
and looking for or giving information on government websites. ‘Big data’ from such sources 
has already opened up a potential for government agencies to develop genuinely ‘free’ (not 
just taxpayer-funded) services, where scalable information provision allows marginal 
consumers to be added at zero (or near-zero) marginal cost (Anderson, 2009). For instance, 
data on house prices recorded by the UK Land Registry are analysed to generate for any 
interested citizen free, comprehensive and real time information on house prices in their area, 
at different spatial levels. Such applications of ‘big data’ are crucial in helping government to 
retain what Hood and Margetts (2007) term ‘nodality’, that is, a central place in society’s 
information and communication systems where the state receives information for free and can 
broadcast messages to which civil society gives special attention or credence. Public sector 
bodies must continuously compete in information and attention terms with the major social 
and economic interests that they are seeking to regulate or influence.  
Other key big data uses are in improving the comprehensiveness and timeliness of 
agency information, as with a border control agency upgrading its ability to scan immigrants 
using biometric passports; using existing information more intelligently, for instance to 
achieve a better targeting of welfare payments or grants to industry; and improving regulatory 
capabilities so as to speed up the detection of problems and to better monitor the 
implementation of corrective measures. In all these uses data collected for transactional 
purposes requires skill to analyse, since it is set up with administrative rationales in mind, 




Machine learning forms the middle part of the big data/ artificial intelligence (BDAI) 
combination. It is ‘concerned primarily with prediction’ (Varian, 2014, p. 5), but may also 
involve data-mining, which primarily focuses on summarizing data and extracting interesting 
findings. The emphasis here is on the capacity of very large-scale (and tireless, frequently 
repeated) iterations of analysis to uncover emergent effects and connections within big 
databases (Armstrong, 2015). There is a contrast with previous forms of programmed 
analyses here, because the computers involved operate inductively or ‘learn in the wild’, 
connecting up information autonomously so as to build a mosaic potentially showing a new 
picture, without the pre-conceptions, mental biases or limits that human analysts can impose.  
Finally, the Artificial Intelligence component of BDAI involves the development of 
algorithms, that is a process of making decisions according to rules that is capable of making 
selections in complex contexts. These are sophisticated choice and detection processes that 
can be deployed so as to produce (hopefully) improved administrative actions from analyses 
of ‘big data’ sources. Algorithmic selection is strongly advanced in the operations of all the 
GAFAM companies, but much less practiced inside state agencies. The first column of Table 
2 shows a typology of AI selection applications (initially formulated by Latzer and 
colleagues). The second column shows some government applications already in use by 
public agencies in advanced industrial countries. Some of the Australian examples here are 
long-standing but unspectacular. For instance, internal search engines in government online 
sites are usually (in most countries) much less effective in finding relevant webpages or 
information than are general Google or Bing searches. Other developments are still new, 
potentially very promising, but limited until recently. The last two rows in Table 2 are areas 
not yet developed in the Australian public sector. Currently no agency is producing 
government documentation using robot writing systems (akin to algorithmic journalism, 
although that is developing fast). Similarly, there is a lot of potential for using tireless and 
impeccably neutral talking (ro)bots to manage service marketing or consultation 
conversations (which can then be text-analysed for emerging themes). In future bots may 
even be able to facilitate focus groups or larger discussion meetings.   
In our 2016 interviews senior officials in most departments, and especially 
organizations with heavy transaction loads, were enthusiastic about the capabilities that ‘big 
data’ advances had for improving their information about and detection of policy problems. 
For instance, analyses in the Department of Human Services showed that children who had to 
look after a severely ill or disabled parent on social security benefits were themselves 
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Table 2: How different types of algorithmic selection applications are or might be used 
in the government sector 
Functional type of algorithms Government sector uses 
Search Internal government search engines 
Observations/surveillance Security and intelligence surveillance via linguistic 
clues 
Facial recognition programmes in CTV systems 
Monitoring employees 
Prognosis/forecasting Predictive policing 
Predicting terrorism 
Predictive modelling of developments (e.g. flu 
waves, or animal diseases) 
Detection of stressful answers in phone transaction 
systems (e.g. may indicate a taxpayer or benefit 
claimant having difficulty in answering questions, or 
lying) 
Aggregating data Data matching across main government IT systems 




Online behavioural public policy or nudge systems 
Scoring performance Reputation systems (going beyond league tables) 
Allocating resources Algorithmic placement of government advertising 
Algorithmic evaluations of resource priorities 
Algorithmic direction of government/emergency 
service messaging in crises 
Producing content Algorithmic production of documentation (i.e. robot 
writers) 
Facilitating personal interactions Online or phone-based consultation bots or 
deliberative process bots (i.e. robot consultation-
conversation managers or facilitators of discussions) 
 
Source: For all but one rows in column 1, Just and Latzer (2014, p. 250). Column 2 and the 
last row are added here. 
Notes: Orange shaded rows show potential applications, not yet implemented. 
 
 
disproportionately likely to end up as long-term recipients of social security. Hence pre-
emptive interventions to give extra help to such children (and their parents) at an early stage 
could offer long-term gains for them as adults, and also potential savings in terms of reducing 
benefits dependency. 
Yet administrative elites also saw some key barriers in developing BDAI capabilities. A 
first group involved privacy constraints on using data only for the original purpose for which 
it was gathered. Constraints of this kind have tended to be quite onerous and also variable and 
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legislation-specific in Australian federal government. However, long-term work has been 
done to try to make data-sharing for legitimate purposes easier to do across departments and 
policy sectors. The second most frequent concern was about data quality. Machine learning 
and AI can only be as good as the datasets used to find connections or train algorithms. If 
data contains inaccuracies, or is limited in what it covers, then analyses or predictions made 
from it can potentially be deeply flawed. Apparent government agency mistakes may create 
reputational damage for ministers and public agencies, invite opposition criticism and attacks, 
and often prove costly in terms of retro-fitting patches or correcting mistakes in online 
processes that are already rolled out. Again, improving data quality in main datasets is a long-
term APS effort.  
A third set of barriers concern linking BDAI processes to the often-coercive powers of 
government, which implies that mistakes in data analysis or prediction can impose substantial 
costs on citizens to whom administrative actions should not be applied. If they occur on any 
large scale, such mistakes may risk collapsing the normal interactions between citizens or 
enterprises and government agencies. Phone lines clog up with complainants, many phone 
calls never get through, and those that do entail long and frustrating waits for citizens or 
firms. Recognizing that an agency has made a mistake takes time, so that an initial period of 
denying or dismissing complaints is succeeded by administrative confusion, and only 
belatedly by acknowledgement of the mistake and systematic efforts to rectify it. Especially 
in large transaction services, the potential for a public and electoral backlash here can be 
considerable. 
 Some of the sensitivities involved in developing BDAI were aptly illustrated by the 
‘robodebt’ crisis of 2016-17, which followed a major data-matching effort by the Department 
for Human Services and its transactions/ welfare payments agency Centrelink. Originally a 
set of processes for detecting possible benefits overpayments were trialled in 100,000 cases 
using human staff in 2015-16. By comparing records of income received and time worked in 
a given year from the Australian Tax Office with means-tested unemployment payments and 
time-specific benefits made to claimants, Centrelink staff sought to eliminate fraud and 
recoup benefit payments that seemed unjustified. The same processes were then automated to 
use only AI detection and with online notification of demands for repayments. These started 
operating in 2016 as the Online Compliance Intervention (OCI). In the initial implementation 
OCI messages often concerned periods stretching back over several years. Early estimates 
claimed that OCI would raise $2.1 billion by 2020.  
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 In practice, the OCI generated thousands of debt-looking notices. Citizens were notified 
electronically on MyGov.au (the federal government’s portal). If they failed to respond 
online, they were then sent a letter to their last known address. Initially they had only 21 days 
to respond (later raised to 28 days) before their case was passed to private debt collection 
agencies. The rolling out of the initiative lead to a storm of public protests as people and 
households were pursued for alleged debts, many of which proved to be incorrect or were 
revised down. Critical lawyers observed that the Department of Human services passed over 
to claimants ‘an inconvenient burden of proof’ (Hanks, 2017) that they were not over-paid, 
whereas in Australian private law it is up to someone owed a debt to prove its existence and 
scale. The political damage increased when the media and critics came up with the evocative 
label ‘robo-debt’ to stigmatize the AI-lead and online operations. Centrelink contact centre 
phone lines were flooded and became very hard to access. And a succession of disturbing 
individual cases of citizens’ being asked for impossible information, or their information not 
being given credence, created damaging press and TV headlines, fuelling left criticisms of a 
government drive against poor people (Forgione, 2017). The Department of Human Services 
and Centrelink were widely criticized by welfare NGOs and activists and legal academics for 
what they claimed were multiple OCI design flaws, and for the ‘aggressive’ manner adopted 
by officials to collect alleged debts (ACOSS 2017). A Parliamentary committee concluded 
that OCI ‘lacked procedural fairness at every stage and had put thousands of innocent 
Australians through the trauma of having to prove they do not owe the money the welfare 
agency demanded’ (Towell, 2017b). 
 The Secretary of DHS later admitted in Senate questioning that 20% of people sent debt 
recovery notices in fact had no debts at all, and in a further unspecified quota of cases the 
sums initially asked for were radically reduced. The Commonwealth Ombudsman (2017) 
accepted the 20% level as legitimate administrative querying, given the existing law, plus the 
large scale of Centrelink’s annual benefits payments and accompanying anti-fraud 
responsibilities. But critics saw the stress imposed on families by non-working agency phone 
lines and repeated referring back of citizens to the online system when they did get through to 
a contact centre (amply documented in the Ombudsman’s report) as imposing unacceptable 
stress on families. The Ombudsman called for significant changes in operational policies 
before new tranches of more vulnerable ‘customers’ were brought into the system. The Audit 




From his exile in Singapore, Paul Shetler the former head of the DTO, publicly 
criticized the two agencies involved, noting that: ‘The problem with this one [OCI] was quite 
simply you had an algorithm, which frankly wasn’t working properly, that was trying to 
match really disparate data sets…  You’re trying to match fortnightly [unemployment 
benefit] data with yearly [tax] data; you’re trying to extrapolate on the results. And it fails’ 
(quoted in Nott, 2017). ‘If they were a commercial company, you would go out of business, 
with a 20% failure rate, a known 20% failure rate, you would go out of business, any other 
kind of [data] matching service would’. 
 The gains projected for OCI were initially large but later scaled down, partly due to the 
swamping of Centrelink phone lines and the public controversy creating a need for changes. 
‘Human services minister, Alan Tudge, told the Guardian [in late 2016] that the new system 
had lead to a huge increase in the number of “compliance interventions”, from 20,000 per 
year to 20,000 per week’ (Nott, 2017). In fact, the Australia National Audit Office (2018, 
Table 1.2) later found that the number of Centrelink anti-fraud ‘activities’ increased, but only 
from 0.99 million in 2015-16, to 1.08 million the following year, and 1.10 million in 2017-18 
– that is less than a 12% increase. In terms of recouping overpayments in practice, the OCI 
reputedly raised less than a quarter of the projected revenue during its first year of operation. 
The Audit Office gave no quantified evidence of net savings achieved over any longer period, 
despite endorsing DHS’s anti-fraud efforts. However, defenders of the system argue that it 
has increased benefit claimants’ awareness of the legal requirement on them to promptly file 
changes of their employment circumstances online with Centrelink (every two weeks), and 
OCI has probably made other savings through deterring fraud or lax compliance with benefit 
regulations. However, it may also have deterred some legitimate welfare benefit claims, so 
that no clear view of OCI’s wider effects currently seems feasible.  
 The end result then was that an ambitious and large-scale transition to AI-only modes 
of operating was introduced perhaps too simply, and perhaps with insufficient testing and 
development for its full-scale roll-out. As in other service delivery crises, the likelihood of 
initial costs savings projections being met can decrease sharply when there is a public 






Is there now any area of modern public administration where digital changes of many diverse 
kinds are not amongst the most pervasive and potentially disruptive challenges that officials 
confront? The trends reviewed in our first section suggest not. As a result, digital roles have 
quite recently become far more central in top Australian officials’ views of what public 
management is and where it is going in future. Shifts in private sector management theory 
towards ‘Silicon Valley’ models have helped top officials to re-value and upgrade their 
previous mid-to low estimates of the importance of digital change. Despite other constraints, 
changes in achieving appropriate organizational cultures in APS departments and agencies 
are still seen by officials as one of the key barriers to thorough-going digital modernization. 
The support of one Australian PM for a time powerfully generalized the recognition of digital 
modernization’s salience amongst administrative elites. But its petering out also highlighted 
the limits of a political impetus for achieving sustainable modernization. The early Australian 
experiences of trying to implement new BDAI techniques in public management contexts 
have also brought out some key limits operating in liberal democratic countries, probably 
necessitating a slower implementation and a longer learning process than ambitious officials 
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1. Our key interviews took place in spring 2016 and involved talking at length with 20 
Departmental Secretaries, Agency Heads and National Managers, eight Deputy Secretaries, 
eight Chief Information Officers of departments, and six senior advisors to government on   
digital/innovation programmes. In most cases interviewees also provided detailed written 
responses to our core questions, explaining how digital changes affected their organizations 
and programmes. For further details, see Evans et al (2019). 
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